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POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE ROOKERFELDMAN DOCTRINE TO STATE AGENCY
DECISIONS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
IN VAN HARKEN V. CITY OF CHICAGO

Rebecca Schmucker*
I. Introduction
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal circuit courts from
reviewing decisions by state courts. Rooker-Feldman is based on the
idea that state courts are parallel to the lower federal courts which,
therefore, do not exercise appellate review over the state court
decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an extension of the
principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, by
reasoning that "lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit
in direct review of state court decisions."'
Generally, courts have only applied the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to state court decisions. Although courts have applied the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to a state agency judgment under limited
circumstances,2 courts have largely refrained from applying this
doctrine to such decisions.3 In doing so, courts have interpreted the
language of the Feldman court literally.4 However, a recent decision
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Van Harken v. City of
Chicago, indicates that, depending on the remedy a plaintiff seeks, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine could apply to state agency decisions.5
Although courts are hesitant to apply this doctrine to state agency
decisions, the language in Feldman need not be read literally because
the policy reasons which underlying this doctrine apply just as readily

*Third Year Law Student.
'Atlantic Coast Line RR. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296

(1970).
2

See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
See infra part II.B.
'See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
5103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997). See infra part III.
3
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to state agency decisions as they do to state court decisions.
H. Bickground
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that a federal district court
does not have the authority to review a final decision of a state appellate
or supreme court.6 Decisions by a state's highest court may only be
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, and only if the
constitutional issues have been properly raised before the state court.7
As the court of appeals in Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., described, "an
inferior federal court established by Congress pursuant to Art. III, § 1,
of the Constitution may not act as an appellate tribunal for the purpose
of overruling a state court judgment, even though the judgment may
rest on an erroneous resolution of constitutional or federal law issues."8
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is founded on two main negative

6

Rookerv. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1908); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
In Rooker, the plaintiffs claimed that Fidelity, who was trustee of two warranty
deeds, had violated the rust agreement The Indiana trial court entered judgment for Fidelity,
foreclosing the mortgage and directing a sale of the property. After the Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment, the Rookers brought suit in federal district court arguing that the state
court judgment violated the contract clause of the federal Constitution and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The district court dismissed the case for
lack ofjurisdiction. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court held that
the suit was not within the district court's jurisdiction "as defined by Congress." Rooker, 263
U.S. at 415.
In Feldman, the plaintiffs filed a petition with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals to wave the District's bar requirement that applicants must graduate from accredited
law schools. After the court denied the petition, the plaintiffs filed an action in the federal
district court alleging constitutional violations which they had not raised below, and seeking
injunctive relief. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court reaffirmed the validity of Rooker,
holding that district courts have no jurisdiction over challenges to state-court judgments in
judicial proceedings even if the challenge was that the state court's action was unconstitutional.
Under 28 U.S.C. §1257, only the Supreme Court may hear such an appeal. Feldman, 460 U.S.
at 486.
'Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.
"Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1142 (2nd Cir., 1986) reversed on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). There is a constitutionally required exception to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine for habeas corpus where a "single federal judge may overturn the
judgment of the highest court of a State." Sumner v. Maa, 449 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981).
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inferences derived from several provisions of title 28 of the U.S. code.9
The first inference is that 28 U.S. C. § 1257, which gives the Supreme
Court appellate review of certain state court decisions, is the only
federal statute that explicitly provides for federal review of state court
decisions. Congress granted original jurisdiction to federal district
courts under a variety of statutes, mainly 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, and
1332.10 Thus, by inference, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 granted exclusive
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review final judgments or decrees
from the highest court of a state." The policy behind this premise is "to
facilitate a state appellate process free from federal interference."' 2
The second inference is that Congress intended to foreclose all
other forms of federal court review of state court decisions, whether the
case is presented as an appeal or for injunctive or other relief. 3
Because Congress gave only the Supreme Court the explicit right to
review the decisions of a state court, Congress meant to deny all other
federal courts that power. This premise recognizes the sensitivity
surrounding federal review of state judicial decisions. 4

9

Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a CrudeAnalysis of
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine'sPreclusionof FederalJurisdiction,41 U. Miami L. Rev. 627,
629 (1987).
'0 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1994). "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000... and is between... citizens of different
states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994).
"Chang, Rediscoveringthe Rooker Doctrine:Section 1983, Res Judicataand the
Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1349 (1980) (arguing that the limit on original
jurisdiction for federal district courts is a statutory corollary of Congress's granting exclusive
power of review over state court decisions to the Supreme Court under § 1257). The Supreme
Court has characterized § 1257 as a limit on its ability to review state court judgments-the
Court may only review judgments from the highest state court. Flynt v. Ohio, 451 U.S. 619,
620(1981).
"Smith, supranote 9, at 629.
I3SeeRcoker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1908); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983). See also Gordon G. Young,
FederalCourt Abstention andState AdministrativeLaw From Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty
Years ofJudicialFederalism Under Buford v. Sun Oil Co. And KindredDoctrines, 42 DePaul
L. Rev. 859, 933 (1993).
'For example, at the time the Constitution was created, many states argued that the
Constitution did not permit federal review of state court decisions. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 516 (3d
ed. 1988).
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Also underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the idea of
federalism. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is designed to preserve the
two distinct legal systems so that each may proceed independently of
the other, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of any federal
questions raised in either court system. 5 In this way, the doctrine
accords with the jurisdiction statutes enacted by Congress which are
designed "'to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts'
and to facilitate the deference necessary for this bi-judicial system to
function properly. 1 6 If federal courts had the power to hear appeals
from state appellate courts, it could destroy the finality of state court
decisions. 7 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also stems from the Court's
longstanding view that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate
federal constitutional claims.' The doctrine also presumes that state
courts must have the chance to decide federal constitutional concerns
with state interests, and that if a federal court interferes with state court
decisions, state courts will be unable to form appropriate state policy.' 9
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not necessarily apply to all
state appellate court decisions, however. A federal court cannot review
decisions which constitute "judicial acts"; a federal court may hear a
case if the state court actions are merely "administrative or
ministerial."2 ° The distinction between these two actions "depends not
upon the character of the body but upon the character of the
proceedings."'" In Feldman,for example, the Court found that the state
bar admissions proceedings, which were conducted by the state's
highest court, were 'judicial acts' even though it conceded that the
state-court proceeding might not have been judicial under state law and
that the denial of the petitioner's application for admission to the bar
was treated "as a ministerial act which is performed by virtue of the

"Smith, supra note 9, at 636.
16 d. (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S.

281,286 (1970)).
"7 Chang, supranote 11, at 1350.
"See, e.g., Huffinan v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (court rejecting appellee's
argument that state court judges would fail in their constitutional responsibilities).
9
Smith, supra note 9, at 636.
2
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 467-77 (1983)
(citing Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 224 (1908)).
2
Id. at 477 (quoting Prentis, 210 U.S. at 226).
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judicial power, such as the appointment of a clerk or bailiff ... .22
The state bar admissions proceedings were "judicial acts" because they
were, in fact, a judicial inquiry which "investigates, declares and
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws
supposed already to exist." Administrative or ministerial acts, on the
other hand, are more like legislation which "looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power. "24
Furthermore, federal courts may still hear an appeal based on the
constitutionality of the rule on which the decision rests.25 However, as
the Feldman Court pointed out, federal district court could not review
such claims if they are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court
action.26
B. Other Circuit Court Decisions on the Application of RookerFeldman to Administrative Decisions
Several circuits have considered the idea that the RookerFeldman doctrine applies to all decisions by state administrative
"Id. at 477-78 (quoting In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 566 (1945)).
"Id at 477 (quoting Prentis, 211 U.S. at 226).
"4 d. Even if a challenge to an administrative procedure were permitted under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it could still be open to Burford abstention in some situations. See
Young, supranote 13, at 889-893.
25Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483.
26
1d at 483. Unfortunately, what "inextricably intertwined" means is not clear. For
example, in Pennzoil v. Texaco, Texaco was challenging the constitutionality of certain bond
and lien provisions, which had not been adjudicated in the state court, and the constitutionality
of the trial court judgment. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). Although Justice Powell, who wrote the
Texaco opinion did not address the Rooker-Feldman question, the other justices did. Justice
Scalia in his concurrence stated that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not have barred a
federal court from hearing this case because the issues raised in the federal court action had not
actually been litigated in the state courts nor were they inextricably intertwined with the issues
that were litigated in the state court. Id. at 18. In Justice Brennan's concurrence, he declared
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not bar the federal action because it did not challenge
the merits of the state court action but only sought to protect the plaintiff's right to an appeal.
Id. at 21. However, Justice Marshall, who concurred only in the judgment, stated that the
federal district court did lack jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because
"determination of Texaco's claim for an injunction necessarily involved some review of the
merits of its state appeal [and] Texaco's constitutional claims were inextricably intertwined
with the merits of the Texas judgment ....
" Id. at 26.
For a discussion on 'inextricably intertwined' see Smith, supra note 9, at 642-43.
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agencies, as well as state court decisions. All of these circuits have
rejected the idea. The courts base their rejection on the language in
Feldman stating that Rooker-Feldman only applies to "final judgments
of a state court."2' Even if the decision by the state agency was a
"judicial act" and not merely "administrative or ministerial,"courts still
refuse to apply the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2"
The courts, however, have allowed for some limited exceptions
to the rule. First, in Narey v. Dean the Eleventh Circuit held that -the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine could apply to state agency decisions that
have been upheld by a state court because then "a challenge to the
agency's decision [would] necessarily involve a challenge to the
judgment of the state court." Second, in Scott v. Flowers and Narey,
the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, respectively, held that
Rooker-Feldman could apply to decisions by state agencies which were
essentially agents of a state court but the doctrine would not apply to
agencies which were independent.3 °
In Scott, a Commission "investigated the complaints lodged
against Scott, declared him in violation of the then-existing Code of
Judicial Conduct, and enforced its determination by issuing a public
reprimand."' Despite the judicial nature of the Commission's actions,
however, the court held that the Rooker-Feldman did not apply because
the Commission could not be regarded as the agent of the state court
system. The Commission was constitutionally established and given a
Furthermore, the
measure of independence from the courts.
Commission's members were not all appointed directly by the state
court; the majority of members were chosen by independent bodies.
The structure and functions of the Commission made it largely
independent of the state courts and, therefore, not agents of the state

27

1vy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir.1991) (quoting District of

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,482 (1983)) (emphasis added); Narey
v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (1 1th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).
"See, e.g., Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201,208 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that RookerFeldman would not apply to a state agency decision even though the court had "little difficulty
in concluding that the [agency's] reprimand of Scott was a judicial act"). See infra text

accompanying
note 31.
9

2 Narey, 32 F.3d at 1525.
3'Scott, 910 F.2d at 208; Narey, 32 F.3d at 1525.
3&Scott, 910 F.2d at 208.
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Similarly, in Narey, the court distinguished a decision by the
state agency, a state personnel board appointed by the governor, from
decisions by a state bar where the court had applied the RookerFeldman doctrine.3 3 The court rejected the argument that RookerFeldman should apply to any state administrative proceeding that is
judicial in nature. Rather, the court held that Rooker-Feldman only
applied to proceedings where the agency is essentially an agent of a
state court, as is the case with the board of bar examiners.3"
M. The Seventh Circuit Decision
Thus far, federal courts have only applied the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to state agency decisions if the agency is essentially an agent
of the state courts or if a state court had already reviewed the agency's
decision. However, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Van Harken v.
City of Chicago35 seems to indicate that Rooker-Feldman may also
apply to state agency decisions depending on what remedy a plaintiff
is seeking.
In Van Harken, the plaintiffs filed a class action suit against the
City of Chicago in the federal district court claiming that the city's new
administrative system for adjudicating parking violations violated the
due process clause of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.36 The court
dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.37 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed with the defendant's argument that a federal court did
not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a state administrative
agency.
The court based its conclusion on two factors. First, the court
32

d
'Narey, 32 F.3d at 1525. See, e.g., Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 907 (1984) (holding that under Rooker-Feldman, the federal court had no
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a state bar proceeding).
3
'Narey, 32 F.3d at 1525.
31103 F.3d 1346, 1348 (7th Cir. 1997).
-16d.at 1348. Class members were composed of both persons who had been adjudge
liable for a parking violation and paid their fines and persons who had received parking tickets
but still had time to contest them. Id. Chicago is now in the process of creating a central panel
system for hearing many different types of ordinance violations.
371d.
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held that it would not require the plaintiffs to exhaust all the appellate
remedies that the state provided in its own courts; they could file an
action in federal court instead.3" Second, the court stated that RookerFeldman could not apply in this instance because of the relief the
plaintiffs were seeking. In this case, insofar as the plaintiffs were
simply challenging the constitutional adequacy of the procedures used
to adjudicate the parking violation, they were not barred by
Rooker-Feldman because they are not challenging the judgment in any
particular parking case. 39 However, to the extent that the plaintiffs were
seeking a refund for the parking fines they paid, they were barred by
Rooker-Feldman. The court based this distinction between the types of
relief sought on the Feldman decision. In Feldman, the plaintiffs were
challenging the constitutionality of the rule under which they had been
denied admission to the bar.4 ° Although the Supreme Court did not
allow the plaintiffs to challenge the denial itself, it held that if the
plaintiffs prevailed on their challenge to the rule, they may or may not
get a new hearing on the denial of their applications for admission. To
that extent, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not prevent a form of
collateral attack upon a state court judgment by a suit brought in a
federal district court. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held that RookerFeldman would not prevent the court from hearing the case for
declaratory relief.4 '
IV. Analysis
Although the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have indicated that
under certain circumstances the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will apply to

3

ld. at 1349. The court pointed out that people who had lost in state administrative

proceedings were allowed to seek relief in a federal district court under civil rights legislation
such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, (1982) (court
rejected the argument that plaintiff was required to exhaust administrative remedies before
suing under § 1983). The court stated that it could not "believe that these cases were decided
as they were simply because the defendants failed to argue Rooker-Feldman." Van Harken,
103 F.3d at 1349.
"Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1349 (citing Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,
997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir.1993)).
4District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 487-88 (1983).
4
Van Harken, 103 F.3d at 1349.
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an state administrative agency's decisions,42 the Seventh Circuit has
expanded these exceptions. According to the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning, a federal court could not have power to review an
administrative decision wherein the plaintiff seeks to challenge the
judgment of the agency. A federal court can only review state agency
decisions when the plaintiff is challenging the constitutionality of the
rule underlying the agency's decision. Furthermore, although the
Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to bring a section 1982 action to
federal court after a state agency proceeding,4" federal courts will not
have jurisdiction to review if a plaintiff pursues the state administrative
remedies.
In Narey, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine could apply to state agency decisions that have been upheld by
a state court because it would involve a challenge to the state court's
judgment." The only alternative to a plaintiff in such a case is to seek
state court review. In addition, even if the plaintiff is challenging the
constitutionality of the rule that is the basis for the administrative
decision, according to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court still
may not review the decision if the constitutional challenge is
'inextricably intertwined' with the judgment by the administrative
45
agency.
The application of Rooker-Feldman, therefore, practically
eliminates the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear state agency
decisions. The only option for a plaintiff is to appeal the decision in
state court with potential federal court review only in the U.S. Supreme
Court.' If a state creates an administrative appeals system through the
state courts, the agency's decision will be virtually free of any practical
federal review because the Supreme Court can only hear a very limited
number of appeals.
Although the language in Feldman states that the doctrine

42

See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11 th Cir.1994).
4
SSee supra note 23 and accompanying text.
46
Amitai Schwartz, State and Federal Relations Under Section 1983, in SECTION
1983 CVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 1988, 615, 652 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series Litigation No. 357, 1988).
43
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applies to "final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings," 7
the policy reasons behind the Rooker-Feldman doctrine can also apply
to state agency decisions.48 The federal courts have focused mostly on
the "court" language in Feldman,rather than relying on the "judicial"
verses the 'administrative or ministerial' distinction. 9 Agency
decisions often are "judicial acts," and as such federal courts should
accord the same deference as to state court decisions.
V. Conclusion
Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has never been directly
applied to a decision by a state agency, that is independent of a state
court, the option of the Seventh Circuit in Van Harken expands the
possible application of that doctrine given the right circumstances. If
this doctrine is applied, states could set up a system of review for their
agencies wherein agency decisions are not reviewable by any federal
court, other than the United States Supreme Court. A state could, for
example, require that administrative adjudications of paternity and child
support orders be registered with the clerk of the court, and be accorded
the same judicial effect as a judicial decision. In practical terms this
would ensure that only state courts could review such state agency
decisions.5 °

47

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).
"See supra notes 9, 11-22 and accompanying text.
49
See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
"For further discussion of this issue, J.NAALJ will publish a casenote in the next
issue of the recent decision in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons,
118 S.Ct. 523 (1997).

_ U.S.

